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Manifestly then, Jones & Laughlin does not control the seventh
amendment claim arising under the OSHA procedure in question. If
that case is given a narrow reading, Judge Gibbons' distinction is
conclusive. Even the expansive test implicit in Justice Marshall's
characterization of Jones @ Laughlin would not mandate a denial of
a seventh amendment claim. And, certainly, Jones & Laughlin cannot
support a holding that all administrative proceedings, including the
OSHA enforcement procedure, are outside the scope of the seventh
amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION
Subject to the foregoing clarifications and expansions, Judge
Gibbons' position clearly represents the current state of the law and
the best thinking. Accordingly, on rehearing, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals will be forced to deal with Judge Gibbons' conclusion
with a more sophisticated analysis than was employed by the
majority in the instant opinion. Hopefully, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals will shun the questionable judicial technique employed by
the majority in Irey when that panel anticipated the Supreme Court,
relying on no more than the "thrust" of certain precedents,G4 and
refused to vindicate a fundamental right. Paraphrasing Judge
Gibbons, in the absence of a case in point in the Supreme Court, it is
preferable to assume that the seventh amendment still has
meaning.65

Criminal P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - D I S C O V E R Y -DISCOVERY
P R E T R I ADEPOSITION
L
IN
UTAHCRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS-S
tate v. Nielsen, 52 2 P. 2d 13 66 (Utah
1974).
The defendant, a Logan, Utah, city commissioner, was charged
with misuse of public funds, a felony, and with a misdemeanor count
of using his position to secure privileges or exemptions. Four days
later he served seven Logan citizens with notice that their depositions
would be taken pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
prospective witnesses were also served with subpoenas duces tecum
calling for the production of certain documents relating to the
criminal charges. In response, the state quickly brought an action for
a declaratory judgment to determine the defendant's right to take
the depositions. The district court issued an order permanently stay643 CCH EMPLOYMENT
SAFETY
& HEALTH
GUIDE(1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927, at 22,729
n.11.
65Zd.at 22.735.
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ing the taking of depositions and also staying the criminal actions
pending appeal. From that order the defendant appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision and held
that the defendant could not depose prosecution witnesses for discovery purposes.

DE BENEESSEAND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF
I. DEPOSITIONS
DEPOSITIONS
FOR DISCOVERY
At common law there was no disc0very.l By the 18th century,
however, courts of equity had developed the suit to take testimony
de bene esse or ~onditionally.~
If the petitioner established (1) that
the testimony of the witness sought to be deposed was material to a
pending action at law; (2) that the witness was sick, old, or about to
leave the country so as to present danger that his testimony would be
lost; and (3) that there was no remedy at law, the chancellor would
. ~the deposed
issue a decree authorizing a deposition de bene e ~ s e If
witness thereafter became unavailable, the depositions taken pursuant to the chancellor's decree were admissible at trial in courts of
lawP The goal of equity and the basis of its jurisdiction was the
prevention of the injustice that would result if a key witness were
unable t o attend triaL5 Discovery of the deponent's testimony was
undoubtedly an incidental benefit of depositions de bene esse, but
the device was viewed solely as a tool for preserving testimony and
not as a means of discoveryO6
The necessity of a collateral proceeding in equity to preserve testimony for an action at law proved cumbersome, and American jurisdictions, by statute, made the remedy of conditional examinations
available at law? The statutory schemes, which effectively superlAt early common law there was no pretrial discovery in civil cases, R. MILLAR,
CIVIL
OF THE TRIALCOURTI N HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
201 (1952) [hereinafter
PROCEDURE
; James, Discovery, 38 YALEL.J. 746 (1929); nor in criminal cases,
cited as MILLAR]
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAW. L. REV.1, 2 (1956); Note,
Criminal Discovery- The State of the h w , 6 UTAHL. REV.531 (1959). I n equity a
bill for discovery provided a limited and somewhat cumbersome opportunity for access to the opponent's case. MILLAR
201, 204; 6 J. WIGMORE,
A TREATISE
ON THE ANGLOOF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS
AT COMMON
LAW$ 1846 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinAMERICAN
SYSTEM
after cited as WIGMORE].However, this bill found limited use in federal courts in the
United States. Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38
COLUM.
L. REV.1179,1184 (1938);see James, Discovery, 38 YALEL.J. 746-49 (1929).
2De bene esse means "conditionally; provisionally; in anticipation of future needs."
BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
476 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). For a discussion of the history in
equity of this bill see J. POMEROY,
A TREATISE
ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE
$5 213-15 (4th
.
ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY]
3Richter v. Jerome, 25 F. 679,680-81 (1885); 1 POMEROY
$ 213.
4Unavailability of the witness was the condition (as in conditional examination) upon
$ 215.
which the use of the deposition at trial depended. See 1 POMEROY
$ 210.
51 POMEROY
'jThe bill was sought by the party to whose case the witness was material and favorable. There would seem to be little incentive to preserve the testimony of opposing
witnesses. See Richter v. Jerome, 25 F. 679,680-81 (1885).
71 POMEROY
$5 210,215.

55 11

CASE NOTES

553

seded examinations de bene esse,* generally followed the procedure
in equity and required a showing of probable unavailability of a
material witness as a prerequisite to taking a testimony for conditional use? For example, the Utah statute passed in 1898 and
modeled after a California law,lo made conditional examinations
available to criminal defendants if the deponent was material to the
defense and if there existed reasonable grounds for concern that he
would be unable to attend trial.ll That statute, now codified as
chapter 7 7-46 of the Utah Code Annotated, authorized the taking of
conditional depositions of defense witnesses in the manner provided
in that chapter "and not otherwise."12
The right to make conditional examinations was codified in Utah
and other states long before the concept of liberal pretrial discovery
gained wide acceptance.13 The primary impetus for the liberal
discovery deposition rules currently available was provided by the
promulgation and adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938.14 Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is
substantially identical to the federal rule, exemplifies that liberality:
merely by giving reasonable notice to other parties, one may take the
testimony of any person by deposition upon oral examination.l5 No
-

-

81 POMEROY
8 215.
%ee, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, $ 30, 1 Stat. 88-90 (also allowed when witness
lives more than 100 miles from the place of trial); MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 233, $ 24
(1959).
OUTA AH CODEANN.$ 77-46 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973). This chapter was substantially identical to CAL.PENAL
CODE$$ 1335-39, 41-44, 47 (West 1970), though the
California statute has been modified since the enactment of the Utah law. An important modification was the deletion of the words "and not otherwise" in 1905. Id. at
8 1335.
llThe Utah statute does not allow prosecutorial depositions to preserve testimony.
Wigmore explains that many states did not allow such depositions in deference to the
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. He claims that admitting previously
taken depositions, after complying with the hearsay rule, however, is not violative of
the constitutional provision. 5 WIGMORE
$ 1397. California has allowed introduction
of prosecution depositions as far as constitutionally allowable. CAL.PENAL
CODE$5 133541 (West 1970).
12The statute, in relevant part, provides:
When a defendant has been held to answer a charge for a public offense or malfeasance in office he may, either before or after an indictment or information, have
witnesses examined conditionally, on his behalf, as prescribed in this chapter, and
not otherwise.
When a material witness for the defendant is about to leave the state, or is so
sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehending that he will be unable to attend the trial, the defendant may apply for an order that the witness be
examined conditionally.
UTAHCODEANN.$8 77-46-1, -2 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
13For a discussion of the status of discovery throughout the United States in the
early part of the 20th century, see G. RAGLUND,
DISCOVERY
BEFORE
TRIAL32-36, 46-53,
267-391 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RAGLUND]
.
14For a discussion of the changes in discovery procedure made by the adoption of the
federal rules see MILLAR
201-28. Most states have adopted substantial portions of the
L. REV. 435
federal rules. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM.
(1958).
WTAH
R. CIV.P. 30 (identical to FED.R. CIV.P. 30).

554

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

reason for taking the deposition need be given. Permission of the
court is required only in special circumstances, and attendance of
witnesses can be compelled by subpoena.16 Although rule 30
depositions are admissible at trial if the witness becomes unavailable,17 such depositions are most commonly used in practice for
discovery purposes, not for the preservation of testimony.18
Pretrial discovery in criminal proceedings has been much more
limited than in civil actions, though increasingly both prosecutors
and defendants are being afforded the benefits of discovery procedures. For example, defendants have been given significant pretrial
access to evidence held by the prosecutor,lg and prosecutors in a
few jurisdictions have been allowed advance notice of intended alibi
defenses.20 Also, a handful of states have followed Vermont by
adopting rules which authorize discovery depositions in criminal
proceeding^.^^ Nevertheless, discovery depositions are not allowed
under the recently adopted federal rules of criminal procedure; these
rules only authorize the statutory analogue of deposition de bene
e ~ s e . ~ ~
Utah has only indirectly confronted the question of criminal discovery depositions. In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court promulgated
rule 81(e) as part of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule
provides that "[t] hese rules of [civil] procedure shall also govern in
any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional r e q ~ i r e r n e n t . " ~Whether
rule
~
8 1(e) authorized rule 30 depositions in criminal proceedings was an
open question until 1974 when the Utah Supreme Court decided the
case of State u. N z ' e l ~ e n . ~ ~

17Rule 30 depositions are admissible at trial under UTAHR. CIV.P. 32(a) if the witness is unable to attend or resides more than 100 miles from the court.
PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY
18For a survey of the use of depositions nationwide, see W. GLASER,
AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
58-67 (1968).
lgSee generally R. Fletcher, Pretrial Dbcovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN.L.
REV.293, 297-304 (1960); Note, Criminal Discovery - The State of the Law, 6 UTAHL.
REV.531 (1959).
20By 1971, 17 states had adopted statutes requiring defendants to give notice of an
intended alibi defense. Comment, The Alibi Witness Rule: Sewing U p the "Hip
CLARALAW.155, 156 (1971). As to the constitutionality of
Pocket" Defense, 11 SANTA
such statutes, see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S: 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970).
2 1 V ~R.
. CRIM.P. 15(a). Florida, FLA.R. CRIM.P. 3.220(d), Missouri, Mo. R. CRIMP.
25.10, and New Hampshire, N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.5 517.13 (1968), have followed Vermont in allowing depositions without court approval. Other states allow discovery depositions with court approval. ALAS.R. CRIM.P. 15(a); MONT.REV.CODESANN. 951802(a)(l) (1948); OHIOREV.CODE5 2945.50 (1975); TEX.CODECRIM.PROC.art. 39.02
(1966). A discussion of progress in allowing criminal discovery depositions is found in
OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
431(a), Comment.
UNIFORM
RULES
2 2 F ~R.
~ .CRIM.P. 15. This rule, adopted in 1946, 327 U.S. 825, 844, in addition to
allowing depositions when the witness may be unable to attend trial, allows depositions of witnesses who have been committed for failure to give bail.
2 3 U R.~CIV.
~ P.
~ 81(e).
24522P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974).
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The plaintiff in the instant case, the State of Utah, argued that
rule 30 depositions were not available in criminal proceedings because such depositions, in the words of rule 81(e), "conflicted with"
the statutory provisions of chapter 77-46. That statute authorizes
depositions only when it is probable that the deponent will be
unavailable at trial. Rule 30 has no such limiting requirement and is
available for discovery purposes as well as for the preservation of
testimony. To the extent, therefore, that rule 30 deviates from the
exclusive deposition procedure of chapter 7 7-46, it is in conflict with
the statute.25
The defendant claimed that rule 81(e) authorized the taking of
rule 30 depositions in criminal cases. He argued that allowance of
discovery depositions would not conflict with any statutory or
constitutional provisions. Chapter 77-46 was the only statute that
discussed depositions by criminal defendants, and it encompassed
within its scope only depositions to preserve testimony and not
discovery deposition^.^^
The court was thus faced with the question of whether rule 30
discovery depositions were within the scope of chapter 77-46's
regulation of conditional examinations. If discovery depositions were
not included in that prohibition, then by the terms of rule 81(e) the
defendant was entitled to take depositions pursuant to rule 30. The
court held that the statutory provision that a witness may not be
examined conditionally other than as provided in chapter 7 7-46
includes within its meaning all types of depositions. Discovery
depositions are therefore not available to criminal defendant^.^^
The court also reasoned that rule 30 depositions would conflict
with the self-incrimination privilege of the Utah c o n s t i t u t i ~ n ? ~Rule
30 provides that "any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party,"29 thus leaving the door open for attempts by
prosecutors or codefendants to take depositions of witnesses, including defendants. The court stated that "[a] n attempt to take a
deposition of a [criminal] defendant would violate his right against
self-incrimination and his right to remain silent."30 In conclusion,
therefore, the court held that rule 30 depositions are not available in
criminal proceedings because, in the language of rule 81(e), such
depositions conflict with the statutory provisions of chapter 77-46
and the constitutional protections against compelled self-incrimination.

25Brieffor Appellee at 2-5, State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974).
26Brieffor Appellant at 4-6, State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974).
27522P.2d at 13-7.
281d.at 1367.
2 9 U R.~CIV.
~ P.
~ 30(a) (emphasis added).
30522P.2d at 1367 (emphasis added).
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A. Misconstruction of Chapter 7 7-46 and of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
There are indications that the Utah Supreme Court in Nielsen
misconstrued chapter 7 7-46 and misapplied the self-incrimination
privilege and thus incorrectly denied the defendant his opportunity
to depose prosecution witnesses. The statute now codified as chapter
77-46 was originally passed in 1898.31 It could not have been passed
in contemplation of discovery depositions: such depositions were not
available under Utah law at that time, they were not in use in any
jurisdiction, and no statute was needed to proscribe their
The
limiting language of the statute, that a defendant may "have witnesses examined conditionally . . . as prescribed in this chapter and
~ only with difficulty be interpreted as a
not ~ t h e r w i s e , " ~can
prohibition of a device not in existence when the statute was
adopted. Arguably the sole intent of the legislature in drafting chapter 77-46 was to make available t o criminal defendants in courts of
law the equitable remedy of the deposition de bene esse and to limit
and control the application of the remedy.34 The "and not otherwise" language serves merely to limit conditional examinations to
those circumstances where a material witness is likely to become
unavailable at a later trial, a requirement long a part of examinations
de bene esse but not a part of discovery deposition procedures that
developed later. Chapter 77-46 is more correctly construed, therefore, as a definition of the parameters of the opportunity to preserve
testimony and not as a prohibition of a device-discovery depositions-not in existence at the time of the adoption of the statute.
The fact that the statute deals only with a defendant's examination of his own witnesses is further evidence that discovery depositions were not within the contemplation of chapter 77-46 and,
therefore, not within the scope of its prohibition. Indeed, that fact
clearly reveals that chapter 77-46 is an expression of the basic purpose of examinations de bene esse, preservation of a beneficial

3 1 U REV.
~ ~STAT.
~ ~ h48
. (1898).
32Although a few jurisdictions began to allow discovely depositions in the early 20th
century in civil practice, ~ G L U Nsupra
D , note 13; Mullen, Depositions i n Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 2 BOSTON
B.J. 21, 23-24 (1958), there is no evidence of use of
such depositions in criminal proceedings.
3 3 U CODE
~ ~ANN.
~ $77-46-1 (Supp. 1973).
S4The legislature could have (1) prohibited the taking of depositions except on a
showing of probable unavailability or (2) allowed them to be taken only at the discre$ 856(d), at 440. In any event, the legislature limited
tion of the judge. See 6 WIGMORE
the use of depositions unless the witness in fact were unavailable. UTAHCODEANN.
7 7 4 6 1 1 (1953):
The deposition, or a certified copy thereof, may be read in evidence by either
party on the trial when it appears that the witness is unable to attend by reason of
his death, insanity, illness or infirmity, or of his continued absence from the state.
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testimony.35 One does not depose one's own witness for discovery
purposes. By the same token, one does not depose adverse witnesses
to ensure the preservation for trial of their testimony. By limiting the
scope of chapter 77-46 to depositions of the defendant's own witnesses, the legislature left discovery depositions, such as those
provided for by rule 30, unprohibited.
The court's argument that rule 30 depositions could be taken in
violation of the self-incrimination privilege is also infirm. Simply
stated, the deposition provisions of the rules of civil procedure cannot be used to compel either a nondefendant witness or a defendant
witness to give incriminating testimony. A nondefendant witness'
privilege against self-incrimination, for example, is only a privilege to
refuse to answer a particular question, and then only when the
answer to the question might incriminate him.36 Even in criminal
proceedings he may be compelled t o appear in court, to be sworn,
and to answer nonincriminating questions.3' By analogy, it would
not violate a nondefendant witness' constitutional right to subpoena
him to give a deposition, t o require him to be sworn, and t o require
his answers to nonincriminating questions.38
Even an attempt to depose a defendant witness does not violate
his right not to be compelled t o testify against himself. The privilege
of an accused includes the right not to take the witness stand. 39
Indeed, at trial the prosecution is probably precluded from even
calling the accused as a witness on the theory that t o do so would
unfairly emphasize to the jury the accused's failure t o testify. 40
However, there would be no prejudicial effect in merely asking a
defendant, outside of the jury's presence, to give a deposition. The
only question is whether he will be compelled to testify against
himself at a deposition under the rules of civil procedure.
Taking those rules as a whole, they provide ample protection
against compulsory depositions of a criminal defendant. A defendant
has two basic alternatives to avoid testifying. He may seek a protective order to stop the deposition proceedings pursuant to rule
2 6 ( ~ ) , ~orl he may simply refuse to be sworn or to answer any
questions or even to appear at the depositionP2 The first alternative
requires affirmative action by the defendant in the form of a motion
35The dichotomy between the two types of depositions is illustrated by the dilemma
sometimes faced by a party who, by discovering an opposing witness' testimony, may
be preserving testimony that would prove harmful if the witness died or otherwise
became unavailable. RAGLUND
52.
8 2268, at 402-04.
368 WIGMORE
S7Zd.
38Zd.
39Id.
40SeeMCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF EVIDENCE
§ 131 (E. CLEARY
ed. 1972).
4 1 UR.~CIV.
~ P.~ 2 6 ( ~ ) .
42Refusal to be "discovered" is apparently prima facie grounds for an order compelling answers. UTAHR. CIV.P. 37(a)(2). However, there is no indication that such an
order would be granted in violation of a defendant's rights.
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t o the court for a protective order. Yet the rules authorize such an
order "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression or undue burden.'q3 Violation of an accused's constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself should
qualify as embarrassment or oppression and hence as sufficient
grounds for the issuance of a protective order.
The defendant's second alternative-refusal to be sworn and to
testify-does not require affirmative action by the defendant. Rather,
the party seeking discovery must, by motion to the court, seek an
order compelling the defendant t o take the stand as a deponent. As
an abridgement of his right against self-incrimination, the motion
would be denied.
B. Pros and Cons of Discovery Depositions in Criminal Proceedings
Though the court misconstrued both statutory and constitutional
doctrines to reach its conclusion in Nielsen, perhaps it had sound
policy reasons for concluding that discovery depositions should not
be allowed in criminal cases. There is the possibility that allowing
discovery by a defendant would invite contrived defenses and
perjury.44 Also, easy access to witnesses might facilitate intimidation
of witnesses.45 And if defendants already have a weighted advantage
in the criminal adversary process,46 defense discovery should be
limited so as to counterbalance restrictions imposed on the prosecution by self-incrimination and due process doctrines.
Yet the arguments against criminal discovery, though widely
supported in judicial opinions, are not ultimately persuasive. For
example, in an oft-cited opinion denying discovery, the New Jersey
Supreme Court argued that "in criminal proceedings, long experience
has taught the courts that often discovery will not lead to honest
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and suppression of
evidence.'"' But the court offers no details of its own experience. In
fact, New Jersey, along with most jurisdictions, has had little or no
experience with criminal discovery because they have provided no
procedure therefor.48 What experience there is suggests that the
fears of perjury and intimidation of witnesses are unfounded.49 One
observer of the results of Vermont's experiment with liberal criminal
depositions claimed that those fears had not been realized after 5

44See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH.U.L.Q. 279,289 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Brennan].
451d.
461d.; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF.L. REV.
56,57 (1961).
47Statev. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,210,98 A.2d 881,884 (1953).
48Brennan 290-91.
491d. The fear of perjury was also a common argument against discovery in civil
cases. Experience has not substantiated those fears. Speck, The Use of Discovery i n
United States District Courts, 60 YALEL.J. 1132, 1154 (1951).
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years of liberal criminal deposition rules.50
In regard to pretrial discovery, concern about an imbalance in
favor of criminal defendants is likewise not well founded. 51
Although the prosecution cannot force the defendant to reveal
incriminating information, the prosecution does have access to policy
investigations as well as to grand jury proceedings. Also, in Utah, the
prosecution is allowed by statute t o take secret inquiry depositions.S2 In contrast, the defendant often has limited investigative
resources,53 and, absent liberal discovery rules, he cannot compel
witnesses to give any information before
Proponents of more liberal discovery argue that the goal of the
criminal system is to protect society's interests, and those interests
are best served if both parties have an adequate opportunity to
prepare for
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the strength
of that argument in State v. G ~ e r t s ,holding
~~
that it was error,
though not prejudicial,S7 to deny a defendant the right to take rule
30 depositions in a quasi-criminal removal proceeding. The court
questioned "why the district attorney opposed the taking of
deposition^,"^^ and stated:
[The prosecutor] may have misconceived his duty. Notwithstanding
the fact that under our adversary system it is essential that he represent
and safeguard the interests of the State, it is neither necessary nor
desirable that a prosecutor conduct either a persecution or an inquisition. His responsibility is t o assist in an inquiry into the facts t o ascertain the truth t o the end that justice be done.59

The dissent in Guerts, arguing that denial of the right to take pretrial
depositions was prejudicial error, pointed out that the use at trial of
discovery depositions which demonstrate prior inconsistent testimony and thus impeach a witness "may make the difference between
guilt and innocence in the minds of the eni ire men."^^ Pretrial
discovery allows adverse parties to make clear to the jury the
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence on each side, thus aiding
the quest for the "truth" of the particular case. Discovery depositions in criminal proceedings should be allowed to the extent that
5OLangrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732-34 (1967).
5lGoldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALEL.J. 1149,1152, 1180-92 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
5 2 UCODE
~ ~ANN.
~ 5 77-45-20 (Supp. 1973).
53Goldstein 1182-83.
54Zd.
55See, e.g., Brennan 291.
5611Utah 2d 345,359 P.2d 12 (1961).
57The court held that it was not reversible error in that case because the defendant
had access to the testimony of the witnesses before the grand jury and was given answers
to interrogatories served upon the prosecution. Id. at 351,359 P.2d at 17.
58Zd.at 350,359 P.2d at 16.
59Zd.
60Zd. at 353,359 P.2d at 18 (dissenting opinion).
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protection against misuse or inequalities to parties can be reasonably
assured.

C. The Problem with Rule 81(e)
The court in Nielsen perhaps recognized that it would be unwise
to apply civil discovery rules61 in criminal proceedings without first
considering problems unique to criminal procedure. There is the
need, for example, to balance the opportunities for prosecutor and
accused to prepare for trial. The rules of civil procedure provide a
relatively neutral discovery system.62 But a system of criminal
discovery ought to consider and, to the extent possible, balance some
of the factors already present in the criminal system which, in
different ways, handicap trial preparation by either the prosecution
or the defense.63 The prosecutor is severely limited in what he can
discover from the opposing party because of the self-incrimination
privilege. The prosecutor does have, however, greater opportunities
to discover information held by nonparty witnesses since he can
often compel them to give testimony at depositions or before a grand
The defendant, except in special circumstances such as
preliminary hearings, cannot force witnesses to give information
prior to
The rules of civil procedure, as used in criminal
proceedings, do not achieve an adequate or fair compromise of these
competing considerations. The civil rules were not designed with the
peculiar problems of criminal discovery in mind. Certainly rule
81(e)'s application of the rules of civil procedure to criminal proceedings does not demonstrate the well-thought-out approach to
criminal discovery that ought to be incorporated into any criminal
discovery scheme.
IV. C~NCLUSION
If rule 81(e) was intended as a poorman's set of criminal procedure rules, it has demonstrated its deficiencies. The court should
repeal rule 81(e) and adopt comprehensive rules of criminal procedure. The Utah court has been authorized to promulgate rules that
could clearly define the allowable parameters of discoveryF6 and
certainly models are available from which the court could frame
effective rules. The court could choose not to allow depositions
other than as provided by the scheme of chapter 77-46. This is the

61The question facing the court involved only rule 30 depositions, but the court attempted to prohibit all use of civil discovery devices. 522 P.2d 1366,1867 (1974).
62W.GLASER,
PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
89 (1968).
63See generally Goldstein, supra note 51.
641d. at 1 187-92.
651d. at 1 180-82.
WTAH
CODEANN. § 78-2-4 (1953) (rules of procedure adopted by the court will
supersede any conflicting procedural laws).
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approach of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.G7 Alternatively, the court could follow the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure and allow defendants to take depositions without court
0rder.~8 The Uniform Rules contain some protection for both the
prosecution and the defense, and the court could devise further
protections if such appeared necessary. A third "middle ground"
alternative adopted by some states is to allow discovery depositions
only on court order.69
Whatever alternative the court may select can only be superior t o
the present scheme of rule 8 l(e). That scheme all too easily leads, as
the Nielsen case demonstrates, to artificial construction or even
misconstruction of statute and rule and to an ad hoc creation of rules
of criminal procedure.

FOR REFUSING TO
Torts-ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE-ANEW RATIONALE
EXTENDLIABILITY
FOR INJURIES
CAUSEDBY NATURAL
CONDITIONSLoney u. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .

The attractive nuisance doctrine has not generally been applied to
injuries arising from natural conditions on pr0perty.l For some time,
however, commentators have urged that liability be applied regardless of the origin of the ~ o n d i t i o n .They
~
have argued that all cases
to date denying attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions
have involved hazards which the child should have u n d e r ~ t o o d ,and
~
that in the great majority of instances the burden on the landowner
of removing the hazard would be exce~sive.~
The claim is that should
a case arise in which the child does not understand the condition and
in which the burden on the landowner of protecting the child is
relatively light, there is no valid reason why liability should not be
FED. R. CRIM.P. 15. See note 22 s u p a .
68See note 21 supra.
69See note 21 s u p a .
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